For the last two months, Yemen witnessed a number of mobile acts of violence in the Southern provinces, from Aden to Zanzibar in the Abyan province to the clashes which erupted at the end of August to control Lauder and claimed the lives of around 33 people. This was followed a few days ago by an announcement made by the Defense Ministry regarding the arrest of a number of elements from Al-Qaeda organization accused of being behind those clashes, while dozens of confrontations erupted between security men and elements from the South Yemen Movement. What is probably most dangerous in this wave of violence is the merger or the mixing between what the organization is doing and what the Movement is doing, as though there were a thin line linking the two.

Although there is no proclaimed or intentional coordination between both sides, they are benefitting from one another. Indeed, the organization may find the adequate climate to ride the wave of the Movement and exploit the turmoil and the popular anger against the governmental circles, institutions, apparatuses and military and security men, while there is nothing preventing it from seeking to fill the vacuum, just like the Huthis did in the North. Therefore, it is not enough for Sana’a to settle for the regional and international positions condemning the terrorism of Al-Qaeda, the last of which was heard in the announcement made by Pentagon spokesman Brian Whitman who said that the United States was studying the extension of a package of comprehensive aid especially to the Yemeni army, in order to help it confront the organization which he believed “constitutes a dangerous and growing threat targeting the Yemeni, American and regional interests.”

The urgent task ahead of Sana’a may be to differentiate between its opponents inside and outside the South, i.e. between the South Movement and the “Qaedat al-Jihad in the Arab Peninsula Organization.” In other words, it should not rely on regional and international support in confronting the organization while neglecting the Southerners and their movement, even if the ceiling of their secessionist demands seems to be difficult to reach. It is firstly required to not allow its confrontation of terrorism to be seasonal, temporary and circumstantial, as the command of Al-Qaeda transferred its activities from the northern neighbor - the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia - to Yemen, due to the comprehensive and ongoing confrontation led by Riyadh against the “errant faction” by all means necessary, including regional and international coordination. This is exactly what Sana’a should do, i.e. launch a comprehensive and ongoing confrontation, and not benefit from Al-Qaeda’s threat to get military support and aid that would enhance the position of the authority and the government in the face of all the political opposition forces.

In parallel to the open war on Al-Qaeda, Sana’a should keep its doors open to dialogue with all the opposition sides and not just specific ones. It should try to do so with the South Movement, and if the Movement’s members were to reject the move, it must find ways that would make them know it is serious about this dialogue, and is willing to seek ways to handle what the Southerners have been suffering from since the 1990 unity, and then the 1994 secession war, in terms of exclusion, marginalization, discrimination, depravation and the absence of equality. It must show them it is serious about securing the widest participation in the political decision-making process that would build a true democratic state in which the decision is not lost between the government’s authority on one hand, and that of the tribes, clergy and influential figures on the other. True, these new secessionist demands will certainly not be met by Sana’a, but if it turns out that this high ceiling is not a mere slogan that could be the object of compromise in any dialogue, it would have at least provided Sana’a with a pretext to confront them they way they choose to, and could restore the internal and even external consensus it earned during the secession war sixteen years ago.

The events in Yemen, whether the wars which proliferated in Sana’a, the South Movement or the increasing activities of Al-Qaeda, showed that this country has become a weak link and an arena open to regional and international conflicts and foreign interference. The Huthi rebellion in the North was not just a domestic defiance to Sana’a, although it was given local social and economic reasons. It constituted a window for a foreign interference that did not solely let in the Iranian winds, although it placed Sa’da on the map of the ongoing conflict in the Middle East between the Islamic Republic and the West in general, and with the United States in particular. Consequently, the fighting of the rebels did not stop until after they exceeded the limits of domestic confrontation. They thus called for foreign intervention from Saudi Arabia, which contributed to their acceptance of the conditions of the political agreement with the government.

For its part, Sana’a knows it was late in trying to deal with the situation in the North before it escalated, while some blame it by saying it could have settled the situation with the Huthis since the breaking out of the first and second wars. However, it used these confrontations to enhance its political position on the domestic and external arenas, and once it realized that the rebellion could not be contained by the tribal forces, it was too late to deal with it domestically and called for foreign intervention. Therefore, if the actions of Al-Qaeda are mixed with those of the South Movement, the country could drown in civil war which would be impossible to resolve via domestic efforts and would prompt foreign intervention once again. This time however, this intervention could come from outside the region, considering that the United States and the Europeans in general perceive Yemen as being a dangerous stronghold for terrorists after Afghanistan and Pakistan, and has started to pose a threat on the region which due to its geographic and political position and its oil wealth, constitutes one of the vital and strategic interests for America and the industrial states in general.

At the beginning of the year and during the London and Riyadh conferences, the superpowers and the regional states, at the head of which is the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, acted to help revive Yemen in the context of aid plans that would fix the economy and place the country on the road toward development in order to dry up the sources of the social, political and military anger and rebellion. However, unless the government in Sana’a fixes the domestic house and rushes to engage in dialogue with all the opposition sides to discuss the ways to secure reform and change, the aid will not do any good. Moreover, unless it benefits from the calm on the Northern Front to handle the issue of the South Movement, it will not be able to wage a successful war against Al-Qaeda and might even face the threat of “Somalization” and division in a best case scenario.

Still, while the responsibility of the government in Sana’a in facing these challenges is crucial, the neighboring states are similarly responsible. Indeed, it is illogical for the Gulf Cooperation Council States to enjoy wellbeing and increasing development while surrounded by a poverty belt with a population count equaling that of all of their people combined. Moreover, for Yemen to be in danger of becoming an arena for Al-Qaeda could make all the accomplishments of the GCC states in fighting this organization go to waste – knowing that they will not be spared from the repercussions of the Southern neighbor’s slide toward civil war, the threats of division and the return to the era of the sultanates which prevailed mid last century. Consequently, the shy attempts to include this neighbor in some GCC institutions may not be beneficial in light of these circumstances and may not constitute the required solution. There is an urgent need for an ambitious economic plan that would quickly bring the social situation in this country closer to its northern and eastern counterparts, so that it becomes qualified to enjoy an added value on the human, economic, military and security levels in a stable regional council.

So, will Sana’a open “all the roads” prior to the loss of the parameters?