Al-Hayat

18.11.09

The support for the war in Afghanistan in the Western countries taking part in it is deteriorating just like what happened in Iraq. Though the capitals of these countries are yet to witness demonstrations against the continuation of the war in Afghanistan, opinion polls highlight the growing opposition to sending more troops to Afghanistan. These polls reveal the growing conviction in the difficulty of achieving a victory in that war, and the increasing apprehension over sending young men to serve as fuel in that pointless war.

This climate was reflected on the political leaders in the countries participating in this war, especially France, Britain, and Germany, which all defend the idea that achieving a victory is possible. But they ask others to increase their contributions at a time they wish to reduce their involvement to the least level. These countries, including the United States, have started attributing the scarcity of tangible results in this war to the Afghan regime and its practices. They overlooked the fact that they created this regime and that the military confrontations are led against the "Taliban" Movement.

What further augments the feelings of apprehension and pessimism vis-à-vis the fate and meaning of this war is apparently the reluctance of the United States which shoulders the burden of this war, both financially and in terms of soldiers.

The administration of President Barack Obama seems to be reluctant about the number of forces that should be sent to Afghanistan so as to reshuffle the equation of the current confrontations and to make the "Taliban" retreat, at least in the densely populated areas. Leaks from internal discussions say the number ranges between 10,000 and 40,000. These leaks touch on the debate over suggestions put forth by the commander of the US Forces in Afghanistan General McChrystal who believes that a failure to meet the military requirements means risking the results of this war.

This debate is a reproduction of the one that accompanied the war in Iraq, and which ended with an American-Iraqi agreement over pulling out the foreign forces within a determined deadline from the Mesopotamia.

It was not possible to obtain such a result in Iraq without the formation of a united government and the restoration of a minimum level of military appeasement. This means that the pullout from Iraq was justified in establishing institutions that are supposed to handle the responsibilities and encounter the crisis. This US policy was consistent with the electoral promises of Obama. In other words, the pullout from Iraq was in favor of this administration.

As far as Afghanistan is concerned, the situation is the complete opposite. The electoral promises focused on the need to combat terrorism in Afghanistan. The Afghan political, security, and military institutions are so weak that they cannot defend themselves, even in their own buildings. Despite billions of dollars invested in development and aid, the Afghan divisions are deepening, and the Taliban Movement is expanding at the expense of the little influence of the central government. It is also imposing difficult confrontations on NATO.

This Afghan reality does not justify – politically – any inclinations to start abandoning the Afghani crisis, especially since the US administration still focuses on the threats posed by terrorism in Afghanistan to its domestic security. War thus becomes part of a strategy to maintain this security.

As such, the United States finds itself ahead of a great dilemma and a serious predicament, when it considers that the core of the strategy – which is under discussion – pertains to the number of the forces only, without the calculations of all the complications of the domestic Afghani situation on the one hand, and the meaning of the "jihadist" confrontation of its forces in Afghanistan.

Such calculations require a comprehensive reconsideration of the relations with the current regime, and a method to attract Afghani classes and tribes and regions to a government that enjoys credibility. This also requires reconsidering the relations of the Afghani regime with its periphery, and sidetracking it from the Indian-Pakistani conflict. It also requires launching credible initiatives toward the Muslims and sidetracking them from the fundamentalist movements that feed on the American mistakes and flaws. This isolates the Taliban – both its Afghan and Pakistani branches – and its ally, Al-Qaeda, from the areas of support and sympathy.

As long as the American strategy is a war strategy in the first place, it will remain unable to achieve victory in Afghanistan. All the experiences throughout the history of this country affirm its resistance to these strategies.