On Uprooting the Baath

Whatever the results of the Iraqi parliament’s discussions today over the issue of those excluded from running in the next legislative elections, and whatever the final formula for resolving this matter, the issue of the Baath Party and what it symbolizes, in the past and in the present, will remain a source of anxiety for the situation in Iraq. And any technical settlement of the issue of the participation of those whom the Accountability and Justice Commission had excluded will not solve the problem, as it is a political problem at the core and not merely one of excluding those who were officials under the former regime from political participation under the current regime.

A technical solution may facilitate holding the coming elections, but it does not lay sound bases for establishing a unifying state. Only a political solution, one based on acknowledging the citizenship of all Iraqis and their equal rights before the law and the political process, as well as on a basis of fair and comprehensive growth for all regions and provinces, can return all Iraqis to the new regime. Thus the issue of the Baath Party comes as a test of the new regime’s ability to set down a political solution.

There is nothing new in saying that the rule of the former regime in the name of the Baath Party has had a disastrous impact at every level in Iraq, its consequences reaching the entire region. And there is nothing new in saying that this regime had been characterized by an incredible ability to oppress, one that reached all Iraqis. Furthermore, it has displaced Iraqis and made them poor and hungry, while they are the children of the richest Arab country. Yet the complications that such a policy involved and the way the former regime was toppled have made the Baath Party the symbol of the new regime’s sectarian character. In other words, strictness in combating and uprooting the Baath Party in Iraq comes coupled with a particular sectarian identity, specifically that of the Shiites, while those who defend this party identify with the Sunnis. The intensity of such symbolism has increased as a result of the terrorist attacks that have targeted the Shiites and the new regime, which have been ascribed to Al-Qaeda and to the remainders of the former Baathist regime.

In other words, the issue of the Baath Party is no longer merely one of political enmity towards the former regime or of political affiliation. It has come to symbolize a certain sectarian and social affiliation, regardless of the sect of those who were affiliated with or worked under the former regime. In this sense, the meaning of accountability and reconciliation has become mixed up, turning into sectarian targeting, especially as the main parties currently participating in rule are of a single sectarian character, were established on sectarian grounds and have fed on sectarian persecution.

Thus the great challenge facing the new regime is how to dispose of the former regime’s heritage without it coming at the cost of further sectarian crises.

Alongside the above, the process of uprooting has reached prominent Shiite figures from outside of the ruling coalition, particularly those affiliated with opposition groups and those allied with secularists, adding to sectarian rivalry the exclusion of political competitors. Thus the slogan of uprooting the Baath Party becomes a political tool in political rivalry, and not just a stance towards the experience of the former regime.

There is yet another matter related to the Baath Party that faces the new regime. Indeed, the Syrian branch of that party is still leading the regime in Damascus. And regardless of the many past and present political disagreements between the two branches, they both hail from the same ideological source and carry the same slogans of unity, freedom and socialism. Thus any move from the new Iraqi regime to uproot the Baath as an ideology will be faced with further crises with Damascus. And if the Maliki government was accusing Damascus of protecting terrorists in Iraq, what was meant was specifically that shared ideological source. This is a political matter par excellence, one which by far exceeds merely accusing Damascus of harboring “Saddamists”.

The relationship of the Iraqi regime with Damascus in turn puts forth its relationship with Tehran. Indeed, on the background of the solid strategic alliance between Syria and Iran, which has an increasing influence in Iraq, Baghdad is faced with how to harmonize between its political and ideological rivalry with Syria and its special relationship with Iran.