Ambiguous Recognition

It is not too risky to say, based on past Lebanese experiences, that the dawn of any political crisis will erase the recognition of the parliamentary elections results. The current opposition, especially Hezbollah, still links its recognition of the victory of the majority, i.e. the March 14 forces, to political conditions. Most notably, the current majority is prodded to change its “behavior,” i.e. its political stances, which deprives it of its right to implement its declared policies in its capacity as the victorious party.

The coming days will show, especially with the election of a new speaker and the start of the binding parliamentary consultations to nominate a premier then form the government, that this recognition is not a political gesture linked to the choices produced by the electoral process, but an attempt to cement the previous status quo. This recognition is an attempt to impose a “national unity government” that ignores the election results under the pretext of preserving the constitution that provides for consensual governments.

The constitution stipulates that all sects, and not all political factions, must be represented in the government. It entitles the elected majority to form the government that it wants on condition that it represents all sects. Logically, those ministers must mostly come from the same political background as the majority. But when the opposition imposes its own representatives on a “national unity government,” then sectarian representation becomes limited to a certain party.

Presently, Hezbollah rejects any Shiite representation from outside its ranks or any representative that does not enjoy its permission.

Failing to recognize the Shiism of the other Shiite figures in the March 14 coalition, the party pushes for uniformity in sectarian and political identity in a blatant violation of the constitution which preserves the freedom of opinion and political allegiance. This also contradicts the rights of the majority that won with popular vote to choose the tools to implement its policies. This undermines as well the recognition of the election results. Here lies the hidden aspect of the demands behind a “minority vote” in the government.

The previous term of the parliament suffered from this perspective towards political life in Lebanon. Armed violence helped impose this perspective as the Doha Agreement showed. If this perspective is endorsed in the current term, then it will become a tradition that cannot be easily redressed later by reviving the distinction between sectarian identities and political choices. This would abort, and for decades to come, any chance for real political reform as provided for in the constitution. In this sense, it would undermine the attempts to abolish political sectarianism.

As for the issue of weapons and the confrontation with Israel, and despite its exceptional importance in the internal situation, it is linked to this confused outlook on the political and sectarian dimensions in Lebanon. This is true despite all the put forth justifications, such as the Israeli aggression and occupation. These justifications restrict patriotism to a single sect only. The state too is being deprived of its duty, as a representative of all factions, to confront any aggression and monopolize weapons. These two rights and assimilating Hezbollah’s weapons represent a technical issue whose implementation might take some time. As for the Palestinian weapons inside and outside the camps, it is a political issue that differs from Hezbollah’s weapons inside Lebanon.