The Iranian Emile Lahoud

In the final years of his term, which was extended by force, the role of then-Lebanese President Emile Lahoud became diminished to the utmost, then disappeared for all practical purposes following the Syrian withdrawal. This was also after the parties to Lebanon’s political conflict engaged in a political and on-the-ground confrontation directly, with no proxies. If it were not for some embarrassment, even Lahoud’s allies in the opposition would have refrained from visiting him at Baabda Palace. After he left office, these allies avoided Lahoud and did not even try to respect formalities for his sake in the recent parliamentary elections; they declined to include his son, a former MP, on their candidate lists, even in districts where a win was not guaranteed. They assigned Lahoud no political role, and the same went for his family; they did not return the favor after he had devoted his presidency to defending the opposition’s stances and policies. Today, Lebanese can barely remember their former president. Perhaps only Damascus continues to receive him today, out of loyalty to Lahoud’s loyalty.

Since Lahoud continue to stand against the current (and later) parliamentary majority, this majority boycotted him and made his time in the presidential seat miserable, using every means possible. If the majority had had sufficient votes, it would not have hesitated to out him.

Today, the same experience, with some differences, is being repeated in Iran, which Lahoud visited while president, and liked. President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, whose recent re-election has been doubted by many Iranians, appears to have entered a presidential term that was extended by force, and by a decision from the high Iranian leadership. Some believe that just as Lebanese MPs were brought together and issued strict orders by the Syrian authorities to extend Lahoud’s term, the ballots of Iranian voters were gathered into ballot boxes, with strict orders from the Iranian leadership to extend Ahmadinejad’s term. However, it appears that the latter will not be the same president who spoke in the name of a united Iran and was excessive in his use of threats, intimidation and challenge to the entire world; he might be forced to sit and behave himself in his office at the presidential complex after the election results crisis revealed that he was nothing more than a “simple employee.”

A few days ago, when Ahmadinejad decided to hold a celebration of his re-election, two-thirds of the Parliament’s MPs boycotted, including 100 MPs who are considered conservatives, and part of his same camp, including Speaker Ali Larijani. This means that Ahmadinejad and his new government’s coexistence with the legislative branch will be difficult over the next four years. If the parliamentary majority cannot remove him, because this would go against the Supreme Leader’s instructions, Ahmadinejad’s social and economic policies, which are said to have increased inflation to disastrous levels, will be under the microscope, and be subject to monitoring and accountability procedures. He will be forced to take into consideration the strength of his rivals and their desires, if he wants his government’s policies to be passed.

As for foreign policy, it is clear also that Ahmadinejad’s theatrics will not receive the same attention. He called on US President Barack Obama to publicly apologize for US “intervention” in Iran’s affairs, after accusing him of following the same policy as his predecessor, George Bush. However, Obama affirmed that he did not take the Iranian president’s statements seriously, because he knew beforehand, and is now completely convinced, that messages in Tehran are received at another address, and the key to the mailbox is not in Ahmadinejad’s pocket.