Saudi Arabia, Syria, Iran…and Lebanon

Western and Arab states that have become engaged in contacts to normalize relations with Syria have relied on a number of signs that they believe Damascus has offered to indicate its readiness to distance itself from Iran. This is what these countries are concerned about at present, as they are ready to gauge Iran’s readiness to effect a settlement with the west and with its Arab neighbors, or continue the confrontation over the nuclear issue and Tehran’s regional influence, which has grown in recent years.

It is natural that returning Syria to the Arab fold be the goal of Saudi-Syrian contacts, which have been extremely active in the last two weeks. This is after Lebanon’s parliamentary elections took place in satisfactory fashion to all, in terms of completing the process itself in an acceptable fashion, or in terms of the results and the victory by the 14 March coalition (because this is what concerned Arab and western states). The backdrop to the Saudi-Syrian reconciliation, on an initiative by King Abdullah bin Abdel-Aziz, was to return Syria at any price. This is because the Gaza war proved, in parallel with the coming of a new US administration and a change in US policy toward the region, that there is no place for Arab states in the new international equation, unless they get their house in order.

However, the leaders of all countries concerned with the issue, who have hoped that steps by Damascus would gradually distance it from Tehran, face the following question: are the Syrians able to move far enough away from its Iranian ally, as desired by the others? This in turn leads to another question: after the domestic (electoral) crisis in Iran, which the regime appears able to overcome, is the country in a position that allows it to be “tolerant” with its allies if they choose to distance themselves? Will this crisis push Iran toward a hard line position and retaining its foreign policy bargaining chips, as hinted by its reactions to the positions that were expressed vis-à-vis the crisis? Or will the crisis prompt Tehran to practice more external flexibility, after having shown the opposite with regard to the domestic front?

Experience has shown that Damascus’ signals, up to now – independence from Iranian policy, its indirect negotiations with Israel, the Barack Obama administration’s openness to Damascus, or the Saudi-Syrian reconciliation – have all taken place under the “ceiling” of understanding with Iran. Any divergences along the way between the two allies have remained under this ceiling as well, since each of them needs the other.

The western and Arab attempts to peel off Syria from Iran, in Lebanon, are no exception to this rule. The overlap between Iranian and Syrian influence in Lebanon has reached a point where taking back things the way they were will require a high cost that Damascus seeks, to justify to itself and to its ally, the acceptance of taking the required distance from its ally of the last four years, during the tenure of President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. Are western and Arab states, led by Saudi Arabia, ready to pay this price?

Damascus has already justified its indirect negotiations with Israel, with its Iranian ally and its allies in Lebanon (Hizbullah) that it received messages through Turkey that Israel (under former Prime Minister Ehud Olmert) was ready for negotiations that would end with the recovery of the Golan Heights, and western openness to Syria. Most likely, Damascus requires a huge pretext to continue the openness between it and the Arab countries concerned with completing the reconciliation with Damascus, to justify its readiness to put distance between itself and Iran in Lebanon; alternatively, it requires Iranian support for a settlement that it intends to conduct with Saudi Arabia, followed by Egypt. This pretext is for it to regain its influence in Lebanon, and with the country’s political authorities, and end the negative ramifications it has experienced during the last four years, beginning with the assassination of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafiq al-Hariri. In this case, the price is justified, to increase the political distance between Damascus and Tehran; it might convince the latter that the benefit from this ally deserves this settlement.

However, are these Arab and western countries ready to offer this many-sided reward to Damascus, while they continue to state, day and night, that there is no going back when it comes to Lebanon’s independence and sovereignty, and that there can be no return (politically) for Syria to managing Lebanon’s affairs, as it did in the past.

Therefore, taking advantage of the atmosphere of regional contacts for the sake of Lebanon’s stability assumes that Saudi Arabia, Syria or both should be prompted to produce demands and objectives that are more modest, with the difficulty of seeing Syria return fully to the Arab fold or regain its influence in Lebanon.