Arab Accord and Blockage in Lebanon

The Saudi-Syrian Summit is laying the groundwork for a new phase in inter-Arab relations, whose challenges are no less difficult and critical than the previous period, which was characterized by inter-Arab division and policies that were in opposition to each other. Dismantling each side’s actions during the inter-Arab dispute will require some effort in order to see a successful move to cooperation in light of rapid developments on the regional and international fronts, whether this is related to the Iranian nuclear issue, or the increasing obstacles to reviving peace talks between the Arabs and Israel.

It is natural that the leaders of the two countries are building on fixed Arab policies through resolutions of Arab summits, which were adopted even during escalating disputes in the region. This is in order to revive the formulas of coordination and joint policies, and unify approaches to “hot” Arab issues that were subjects of dispute, led by Lebanon. However, time is needed to produce creative political settlements that can anchor a return to coordination and harmony.

Lebanon has been a major reason for the dispute between Saudi Arabia and Syria in recent years, and specifically since 2005. The agreement between the two must cover this arena, and be reflected in it, along with the Palestinian arena. If Syrian-Saudi accord is expected to prompt the Lebanese to complete the formation of a long-awaited national unity government, whose establishment has been blocked, then this agreement should constitute a means of achieving Palestinian reconciliation, which has been blocked since 2007.

If Syria, since 2006, has been able to block the rule of the majority in Lebanon, which was allied with the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, it did so after its withdrawal from Lebanon. Syria did this in alliance with Iran, and by relying on local allies who were different from those used during its previous phase of managing Lebanon’s political decision-making prior to 2005. It made Hizbullah its prime ally, along with the leader of the Free Patriotic Movement, General Michel Aoun. During the period of inter-Arab dispute, the struggle centered on who would control political decision making in Lebanon; Syria tried to block this decision making after it felt that its being forced to withdraw from Lebanon and be blocked from managing its affairs was a coup d’etat against it, since Lebanon is a vital arena of its influence and regional role. Despite the influence that it continues to wield in Lebanon through its allies, Syria has failed to recover its control over Lebanese decision making, even though it has succeeded in blocking it.

Meanwhile, the other, Arab-international axis, anchored by Saudi Arabia, was unable to cement the establishment of independent political decision making in Lebanon’s official political establishment. However, it prevented Syria from recovering its pre-2005 control, even though Damascus had added Iranian support to the elements of its influence in Lebanon.

It is not unrealistic to hear some describe events as follows: the practical result of the inter-Arab conflict over Lebanon was each side stalemating the other’s plans for a country where, despite its small size, key countries were concerned with retaining a high degree of influence, or control over its decision making, as in the case with Syria.

If one side in Lebanon saw the Saudi role in Lebanon as support for its independent decision making vis-à-vis Syria, other groups believe that a degree of independence does not mean denying Syrian influence in the country.

If this is true, then a return to inter-Arab agreement after a period of conflict assumes the following: a precise political settlement over a degree of stability in Lebanon’s central political authority reflects a move away from the policy of blockage.

If this is also true, then a precisely-drafted political settlement in parallel with reconciliation in Lebanon must address the question of how to calculate Syria’s influence, which will reassure Damascus about its vital interests in its neighbor. Where does the Iranian factor stand vis-à-vis this settlement and this influence? Will Tehran allow Damascus to forge this settlement on its behalf, or does the Syrian leadership require, in view of its strategic relationship with Iran, its partnership, in order to abandon the policy of blocking the rise of the official Lebanese political authority?