It is not yet Time for a Palestinian Confrontation with the Obama Administration

New York - The leaders of the Palestinian Authority have committed yet another mistake by wearing the garb of public diplomacy, prancing in the spotlight and engaging in unnecessary battles, thereby aborting a good idea, one that would have had fair chances of success, had it remained the topic of stern talks behind the scenes in capitals and at the United Nations. Such media ruckus on the Palestinian side was met by an emotional Israeli media campaign that misrepresented the fundamental purpose and ruined the efforts of the Palestinian and Arab side to have a resolution issued at the UN Security Council, one orbiting around delimitating the borders of the Palestinian state as closely as possible to the 1967 borders and linking the Gaza Strip to the West Bank by swapping lands between Israel and Palestine within the framework of equivalent exchange. Israel and those blindly loyal to it have purposely engaged in provocation and misrepresentation, and have succeeded in spreading ideas that have nothing to do with the fundamental idea, ascribing them to Palestinian efforts. Thus they spoke of claims of the unilateral declaration of a Palestinian state, and threatened of consequences that will face any unilateral measures. The Europeans have fallen into a vicious circle and have gradually retracted ideas they had previously repeated publicly, in the realm of delimitating the borders of Israel and Palestine through the procedure of a Security Council resolution over the 1967 borders of the two states, and the United States has rushed to pull the rug from under the feet of any action soon at the Security Council in such a direction, asserting that its support for the establishment of a Palestinian state is restricted to the establishment of such a state as a result of negotiations between the two sides. Thus, considering the elusion of the Europeans, the fears of the Americans, the threats of the Israelis, and the worsening state of division between the Palestinians, as well as their outbidding sometimes with Arab support, we must return to once again draft a realistic map of the choices available to the Palestinians.

The head of the Negotiations Affairs Department in the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), Saeb Erekat, has made a mistake – even if he was right. He made a mistake with the media gathering that accompanied him by talking about a nonexistent draft resolution before the Security Council, placing the carriage ahead of the horse amidst public diplomacy that was understood in UN circles as merely a message of action and not as a serious movement. This is how initiatives are killed before being launched, and this is how a draft resolution of the Security Council is nipped in the bud.

If Erekat’s purpose was to compensate for silence in Geneva, where the Palestinian Authority should have clearly raised its voice, even if it was forced to reluctantly agree to postponing looking into the recommendations of Judge Richard Goldstone over Israel and Hamas having committed war crimes in Gaza, such compensation was an excess and a misestimation that has led to greater harm.

Indeed, Erekat has provided both Hamas and Israel with ammunition to inflame yet another wave of the campaign against the President of the Palestinian Authority, Mahmoud Abbas. Erekat has also pulled out of the hands of the Europeans and of the US Administration assets that would have helped the Palestinian President, who has the constitutional power to conduct negotiations or to stop them. Indeed, even if Mahmoud Abbas insists on not extending his term until elections are held or on resigning the Presidency, the next president would have inherited the idea and the effort exerted to place the Palestinian state in the framework of the 1967 borders.

Nasser Al-Qudwa, whose name repeatedly comes up as perhaps the successor to Mahmoud Abbas, was Palestine’s delegate at the United Nations when the Security Council, on November 19, 2003, adopted Resolution 1515, which Qudwa described as a beautiful achievement, even in its number. That resolution included three active articles, which are:

1. That the Security Council supports the road map set down by the Quartet for the Middle East, based on performance and leading to resolving the Arab-Israeli conflict on the basis of the existence of two states.

2. That it calls upon all parties to fulfill their commitments as indicated in the road map in collaboration with the Quartet, and to work towards achieving the vision represented by two states living side-by-side in peace and security.

3. That the council resolves to keep the issue under its observation.

Since then, the view, or in fact the strategy, has been for the next step to be issuing a resolution that speaks of the 1967 borders as the borders of the two states, Palestine and Israel, with an agreement over the principle of land exchange to allow Gaza and the West bank to be connected within one Palestinian state. Nasser Al-Qudwa knew this, and current Palestinian delegate at the United Nations Riyad Mansour knows this and perfectly understands the importance of gathering the support of the main countries for any draft resolution before addressing it publicly.

President Mahmoud Abbas spoke with Arab ambassadors in Washington before heading to New York about ideas orbiting around delimitating the borders of Israel and the Palestinian state, then negotiating over the issues of Jerusalem, refugees and security. The purpose of heading to the Security Council to have a resolution over the borders of the state issued is to leap over the obstruction represented by Israel’s stance on settlement-building without transgressing legal authorities and international legitimacy, which are the Palestinians’ most important ally. To be precise, the idea does not involve leaping over settlement-building, but rather focuses on the end of the road, which in turn would resolve the issue of settlement-building.

Certainly, it is necessary for the Palestinians and Arabs to adopt a determined policy that would strengthen the bonds of establishing the Palestinian state as a de facto situation on the ground and in international formal bodies, by providing substantial financial support to building Palestinian state institutions on the ground and providing the UNRWA with funds to educate refugees in camps, as well as by action in European capitals and with Washington based on clear ideas accompanied by a diplomacy of patience, insistence and perseverance.

The Palestinian President has clarified that “The matter of the declaration and the matter of going to the Security Council is not a unilateral decision. The decision emanates from an Arab follow-up committee that was convened recently (...) and which agreed to go to the Security Council to say that it supports an independent Palestinian state within the borders of June 4, 1967”. What is being discussed now is setting a date for a meeting of the Council of Arab Ministers with all of its members to look into the recommendation of the follow-up committee. If the ministers resolve to head to the Security Council, this must be coupled with a campaign in world capitals and with a simple and concise draft resolution that employs the words of Western leaders themselves.

Indeed, US President Barack Obama spoke before the General Assembly of a state of Palestine that would replace the Israeli occupation of 1967 and called for negotiations over a permanent solution to address the fundamental issues, including that of Jerusalem. Traditionally, the Americans have in the past resisted putting forth draft resolutions over the Arab-Israeli conflict at the Security Council, repeatedly resorting to the use of the veto against any draft resolution that criticizes Israel.

The United States, Russia and Europe preventing the Goldstone Report from reaching the Security Council has its own reasons and elements, and it does not mean that these countries intend to prevent addressing the Palestinian-Israeli issue at the Security Council. In fact, to the contrary, the US seems willing to lift the cover of protection from the Israeli government if it persists in its arrogance and rejection of peace. Thus the Arab side must examine this aspect very carefully to decide whether it wants media escalation and the veto for electoral ends, or whether it wants to build lucidly and wisely upon the decisions of international legitimacy. There is no need for one battle after another over the bases or the conditions of resuming negotiations. There is no need to delve daily into the future of the negotiation process. In fact, it would perhaps be better for the Arabs and the Palestinians to think in the language of “so be it” and to inform Israel and the members of the Quartet of it with utter clarity.

Israel’s threats in the face of what it has called unilateral Palestinian measures seem nearly funny and sad at the same time: Israel, the master of unilateral measures, awakens to the illegality of such measures and resorts to threats of annexing the large illegal settlements established on the lands of Jerusalem and the West Bank. It has threatened to announce the annulment of all agreements ratified with the Palestinian Authority, starting with the Oslo Accords. The prime beneficiary of annulling the Oslo Accords would be the Hamas movement, but it would also result in overwhelming chaos, the consequences of which would reach Israel and not just the Palestinians, who have grown weary of the occupation and of the promises of negotiations.

All of these Israeli threats have come to reflect a latent fear within the ruling institution in Israel of UN resolutions and international legitimacy. This institution wants to deal with the Palestinians alone, as they are the weaker side away from international sponsorship, and certainly without a legal and legitimate authority of reference like the one provided by binding Security Council resolutions. Israel itself was established by virtue of a UN resolution issued not by the Security Council, but by the General Assembly. The Palestinians acting upon the idea of heading to the Security Council to obtain its support for an independent Palestinian state within the 1967 borders seems equivalent to a “critical threat” to Israel, as suggested by Israel’s own threats.

What the Palestinians and Arabs should do is become characterized by calm diplomacy and give up loud diplomacy. Indeed, there is no need to officially withdraw from negotiations, nor is there need to yield to the Israeli campaign that depicts the Palestinian side as refusing to return to negotiations. There is no need to continue to rely exclusively on the promises of the peace process, nor is there need to officially divorce the peace process. Let the next phase be one of resting between two rounds, during which ideas can be gathered to regain the momentum of initiative. Indeed, it is important for the Palestinians to remember that international legitimacy is by their side, and that it is necessary to protect and strengthen it, not to weaken it – through a veto or by doing away with ratified agreements. It is important for them to remember that the world is still waiting for what will result from Barack Obama’s method of dealing with those who challenge him, as he seems patient and obedient, while his political record is filled with those who mistakenly believed him to be the weak side of the equation. Indeed, the time has not yet come for a confrontation with the US Administration for it to be forced to abandon the Palestinians, and this is what those who call for inciting outbidding, confrontation and media boasting should be wary of.