The Violence of Football and the Violence of Politics

Supposing that what took place in the qualification match for the football World Cup between the Irish and French teams had taken place during the similar match between the Algerian and Egyptian teams, one can imagine that the degree of violence between the supporters of the two Arab teams could reach the extent of war between the two countries, and perhaps between one of them and the country of origin of the match’s referee.

The game between Algeria and Egypt was a clean one. The Egyptians scored clean goals in the first match in Cairo, and the Algerians scored a clean goal in the second match in Khartoum, qualifying for the World Cup. If such is the case and the known incidents still took place between the supporters of the two teams, then what could have happened had the outcome of the game been determined by a mistake made by one of the players, as in the case of Thierry Henry earning his country the qualification with his hand, knowing that FIFA refuses to grant rematches in such cases?

The Irish protested the outcome, being linked to a mistake in the game, the French refused a rematch and FIFA supported their stance. Yet there was no note of media uproar and diplomatic recalling, nor was there vandalism or attacks against embassies. French-Irish relations, at both the official and popular level, have continued as they were before the decisive match. Such matters can be noted at every international championship, including those in which an Arab team would be competing. Similarly, no Arab football championship has turned into a fierce war between the participating countries.

What happened between Algeria and Egypt, then, has nothing to do with football, as it has nothing to do with the mere fact of the teams being Arab ones. The blame does not fall on the game which, at the occasion of the World Cup, turns into the widest arena for people from all over the world to meet and get to know each other, nor are the Arabs to blame merely because of the violence that accompanied the Algerian-Egyptian match.

Arab “wise men” have volunteered to condemn the game and mourn the loss of Arab nationalism, and have started denouncing practices completely unrelated to the great nationalistic battles being waged by the Arabs and giving lectures on unity politics. It is as if the two countries of Egypt and Algeria were frankly and officially announcing giving up their Arab identity and presumed joint Arab interests. In other words, it is as if a great political change had occurred in the two countries as a result of this match. One of those “wise men” even went as far as calling for “defusing the conflict”, which in this case is the game of football, a call equivalent to that of banning football matches between Arab countries, not to mention the fatwas (religious edicts) issued by satellite television networks that nearly damn those who play in them, those who broadcast them and even those who watch them!

If the level of violence that accompanied the Egyptian-Algerian match is unprecedented, in terms of turning into a problem between two countries, football stadiums are no strangers to such violence, the motives of which must be looked for in places other than politics and national pride (there are many studies that explain the meaning of such violence in football stadiums, and they all stress on psychological and personal factors in those who engage in it). And like any football-related violence, what took place in Cairo and later in Khartoum between the supporter and fans of the two teams was no different in terms of such motives, before the occasion was turned into a national incident, one concerned with political dignity and pride, and into a mutual political campaign reaching the state and its political system.

Indeed, what took place in terms of mutually exchanged political campaigns should be looked for in the internal political situation in both countries, not in football or in the violence of supporters. Indeed, things seem as if, at a specific political moment in both Egypt and Algeria, there was the need to lead a loud political battle that would gather a broad popular base willing to engage in it. Thus the violence of stadiums is added to that of domestic politics, and matters erupt in the way we have seen in Cairo and Algiers.

It can be asserted that none of this would have happened had the match taken place between Algeria and any Arab country other than Egypt, or between Egypt and any Arab country other than Algeria. What has happened has happened because the match took place between these two particular countries at a specific political moment for both of them, not because football incites to violence or because Arabs resort to violence in order to vent some kind of presumed national frustration.